July 15, 2007

The government has a clear responsibility to act on the growing backlog of important legislation. But what about the Parliament itself? After all, members of Parliament, not just the government, are supposed to be important links in the democratic chain of accountability. Citizens vote, delegating responsibility to MPs representing them. MPs delegate responsibility for implementation to the government in office which serves the citizens. Citizens, in turn, give feedback on the quality of service by voting or not voting for MPs. One long chain of delegation, in theory.

Several features of India’s parliamentary system weaken the middle link in this chain.

One, if the government doesn’t introduce something, it will likely never be debated - no matter how many in Parliament or the public they represent would want a bill to be tabled. Only two and a half hours per week are available to discuss private members’ bills and resolutions. The restriction is not particularly unusual in the international context: the Greek Parliament debates private member’s bills once a month, and the UK allocates just five per cent of the time in session to private member’s bills. And the rule makes sense in large Parliaments in which a cacophony of bills could bring all policymaking to a halt. But it does mean that there is no back-up plan if the government is not acting.

Two, the parliamentary process limits non-government input on amendments and in reviewing the bills before they are voted on. The Parliament has a number of committees in charge of reviewing policies, actions, and expenditures ex post, but limited scope to review and amend them before they pass. Committees elsewhere not only have the resources to mount effective critiques, but the fact that they last over time enables them to build the political capital and expertise to bargain with the ministries on any one issue. Committees in Austria, Iceland, Sweden, and Switzerland can even propose legislation independently.

To make it worse, any amendments that the committees do suggest must be approved by the Cabinet. Greece is the only parliamentary democracy with similar provisions.

Three, MPs - even members of the ruling coalition - have little room to criticise constructively: the options are to issue a non-binding and non-forceful statement, or the “nuclear option” of bringing down the government. Neither makes for a credible threat: the first because it is not a threat, the second because it’s usually not credible to threaten to destroy one’s own position of power. The options for holding up the budget, one of the most crucial pieces of legislation are especially limited: a failed budget proposal is automatically a vote of no-confidence.

Paradoxically, the government’s constant need to demonstrate majority support means that policies that a majority supports can fail: they have to attract the support of a particular majority - the government - not just any majority in Parliament. And it can also mean that policies a minority supports can pass: in coalition governments, a strident minority can demand what it likes if it holds the power to bring down the government and can convince others that it would actually do so.

The cumulative effect: there is no back-up plan when the government doesn’t or can’t act. The Opposition can behave irresponsibly: if the system prevents them from acting constructively, then who is to blame them for inaction? And the citizens pending the election cycle seek redressal through any alternative that has a chance of working, whether it is supporting interventions by unelected Supreme Courts operating out of their constitutional territory, going directly to unelected civil servants to plead, or walking into a local government engineer’s office and yelling at him. There is need for concerted action even in the time left for this government:

• Permit more time for more suggestions from the floor. Sweden, for example, allows all members to introduce bills in the 15 days around the time of the Budget Bill in January, and on any topic related to legislation that the government proposes. This kind of change, in conjunction with some distinction between “disagreement” and “no confidence” would mean that pending business that has a chance of gaining majority support would actually get introduced. For better and worse, it would also put the government on the spot if it had to explicitly vote down a popular policy rather than implicitly veto it by not proposing it.

• Separate disagreements on one policy, from disagreements on all policies. Most other parliamentary democracies make some distinction between criticism and no confidence. Germany, Spain and (since 1995) Belgium, for example, require an explicit constructive vote of no-confidence in which the Parliament elects a new government simultaneously while dismissing the old.

• Most importantly, MPs should vote themselves some research support. Most parliamentary committees in Western Europe have some professional staff support and can solicit information from a variety of sources. This will also reduce their helpless dependence on the very bureaucracies they want to hold accountable. This means outside experts, interest groups, and others, in addition to the ministries. Filling this missing link will improve governance. It will also improve the value and content of governance for the average citizen.